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Abstract
In this paper, we present an optimization based formulation for privacy-utility tradeoff in the
Ensemble and Unscented Kalman filtering framework, with focus on space situational awareness.
Privacy and utility are defined in terms of lower and upper bound on the state estimation error
covariance, respectively. Synthetic sensor noise is used to satisfy these bounds, and is determined
by solving an optimization problem. Given privacy and utility bounds, we present optimization
problem formulations to determine a) the maximum noise for which utility is satisfied or the
estimation errors are upper-bounded, b) the minimum noise for which privacy is satisfied or the
estimation errors are lower-bounded, c) the optimal noise that satisfies utility constraints and
maximizes privacy, and d) the optimal noise that satisfies privacy constraints and maximizes
utility. We demonstrate application of these formulations to the tracking of the International
Space Station, and highlight the optimal privacy vs utility tradeoff for this dynamical system.
1 Introduction
As space becomes more congested, maintaining a timely and accurate picture of space activities
simultaneously becomes both more important and difficult. The seriousness of this problem has
been highlighted by the 2009 collision between U.S. Iridium LLC and Russian Federation Cosmos
satellites, which destroyed both the satellites and added more than 2,000 additional pieces of debris
in space. Prior to that, in 2007, China used a hit-to-kill interceptor to destroy their Fengyun-1C
satellite. Since then, U.S. Space Surveillance Network has cataloged more than 2,200 trackable
debris fragments larger than 10 centimeters originating from this collision [1]. It cannot be em-
phasized enough that as the number of assets orbiting Earth increases the danger and effects of
collisions also increases. The new Starlink Mission of SpaceX is planned to have 12,000 satellites [2].
With the increased number of space objects, we can no longer assume that the space is big and
collisions between space objects will rarely occur.
In fact, close approaches and even collisions occur with increasing regularity, with at least a dozen
collisions having occurred in LEO. There are also strong indicators of at least five collisions in
GEO [3–7] since the dawn of the space age. There could easily have been more collisions in both
LEO and GEO that have not been publicly disclosed [8]. More recently on September 2 in 2019,
the European Space Agency (ESA) maneuvered one of its Earth science satellites Aeolus, to avoid
a potential catastrophic collision with a SpaceX Starlink satellite [9]. The maneuver took place just
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about half an orbit before closest approach, indicating the importance of maintaining situational
awareness in space.
Space situational awareness (SSA) refers to the ability to view, understand and predict the physical
location of natural and manmade objects in orbit around the Earth, with the objective of avoiding
collisions. To address the growing SSA challenge, the U.S. and other nations, along with commer-
cial operators, have established a new approach to exchange information regarding space objects
(USSTRATCOM & Space Data Association), hoping to increase the safety of satellite operations.
While there are significant benefits to sharing of data from the SSA perspective, there are several
privacy/security related concerns from both commercial and military perspectives, which lead to
conservative data-sharing policy. For example, the policy for sharing SSA data from military owned
sensors, unveiled by U.S. Strategic Command in 2014, has led to removal of more SSA data from
public access. This includes removal of data on the estimated size of space objects in the public
satellite catalog, and limitations on what data is provided privately to satellite operators. Many
of these restrictions stem from the desire to hide national utility satellites and their activities [10].
This has led to some operators question the accuracy, and especially the completeness, of the in-
formation provided to them by the US Department of Defense (DoD). For example, some South
Korean government officials estimate that their country receives data on only about 40 percent of
the objects tracked by the DoD, due to sensitivity of U.S. assets [11]. This has resulted in lack of
confidence in the DoD-provided data, especially in the commercial sector. This lack of confidence
in the data also undermines any collision warning issued based on this data, since it is expensive for
operators to perform a maneuver. Thus, a security-conscious data sharing policy, impedes utility
and commercial growth of the space industry.
On the other hand, improving utility raises several privacy/security concerns. National security
concerns have become more critical, owing to the recent development of anti-satellite weapons and
other counter-space capabilities. Accurate knowledge of space assets present risks from directed
energy weapons, electronic jamming, kinetic energy threats, and other orbital threats [12–14].
From a commercial perspective, there are concerns that access to highly accurate SSA data will
allow operators to assess their competitor’s coverage limits, detection capabilities, and details of
operation. This can be detrimental to the emerging space economy. In summary, low-accuracy
SSA data increases risk of collision but reduces risk from counter-space operations and protects
details of operations, i.e. it improves privacy but degrades utility. Whereas, high-accuracy SSA
data improves utility but degrades privacy/security.
Currently, the US military adds synthetic noise to the public domain SSA data, much like the
early GPS data model, which impacts how accurately the space objects can be tracked. Currently,
this noise level is chosen conservatively and is mostly privacy or national-security conscious. With
the deployment of mega-constellations in low earth orbits [15], this conservative approach will not
work and will impede accurate space traffic management. Consequently, in June 2018, the Space
Policy Directive 3, directed the US Department of Defense to give the publicly releasable portion
of its space situational awareness data to the Commerce Department [16]. This initiative will allow
non-military entities to create and sell SSA services to governments and satellite operators. Thus,
the SSA data can be commoditized [11], with stratified pricing models reflecting different levels
of accuracy, enabling creation of several value-added services in space-data analytics. These new
developments in SSA data sharing, present an important question: what should be the accuracy in
the SSA data that satisfies given utility and privacy objectives? What we lack is a framework that
addresses this question in a methodological manner, enabling more informed privacy and utility
preserving policies for sharing SSA data.
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Privacy in dynamical systems is an emerging area of work, and has been primarily in differential
privacy [17–23], where the focus is to ensure that participation of an entity or an individual does
not change the outcome significantly, and also guarantees privacy of an entity based on aggregated
data from many entities. Our focus here is on inferential privacy [24–26], where we are trying to
bound the inferences an adversary can make based on auxiliary information. In both these kinds
of privacy, the mechanism for data obfuscation is either corruption of data with synthetic noise, or
projection of data to a lower dimensional space. In this paper, we use synthetic noise to formulate
various algorithms for privacy-utility tradeoff.
Our focus is on privacy of entities that are governed by dynamical systems. The dynamical system,
which is a space object in this paper, is observed by various geographically distributed sensors.
These observations are functions of states, and are noisy due to imperfect sensing. A filtering
process uses these measurements to estimate the true state of the space object, which also has
errors. The accuracy of the estimates is a measure of inference privacy. More error results in more
privacy, and consequently less utility. For dynamical systems with Gaussian uncertainty models,
Kalman filter gives the minimum variance estimates, which is function of the prior, the sensor
model, and the sensor noise. In [26], the authors manipulate the measurement data by compressing
it using a linear transformation, hereby regulating the error covariance matrix or the inference
privacy. This linear transformation, which creates synthetic sensors, is designed appropriately to
achieve the privacy goals. In this paper, we regulate the inference privacy by manipulating the
measurement noise covariance. This is done by adding synthetic noise to the measurements.
In this paper, we look at the trade-off between privacy and utility in the Ensemble Kalman Filter-
ing (EnKF) [27] and Unscented Kalman Filtering (UKF) framework [28], which is commonly used
for data assimilation and forecasting in SSA applications. We assume that the privacy and utility
constraints are specified in terms of bounds on the error variances in the state-estimates. This
paper presents a convex optimization framework that determines the optimal synthetic noise to be
added to the sensor data, which will satisfy the given privacy and utility bounds. The formulation,
however, is quite general and is not limited to SSA related problems. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that addresses the privacy-utility trade-off using synthetic noise in the
EnKF/UKF framework. Our future work will be on extending this work to other particle-filtering
algorithms [29].
This paper is organized as follows. We first present the model for the space object used in the
privacy-utility formulation. This is followed by a very brief technical summary of Ensemble and
Unscented Kalman filtering. Key technical contributions are presented in §3, as theorems 1 to 4,
and corollary 1. This is followed by an example that applies the proposed privacy-utility formulation
to a realistic space-object tracking problem and considers various scenarios. The paper concludes
with a summary section.
2 Background Material
We next present preliminaries on dynamical models of space objects, their sources of uncertainty,
and measurement models. This is followed by a brief description of Ensemble and Unscented
Kalman filtering. In particular, how the estimate and error variances are computed from particles,
and updated from available measurements. This section also defines all the notations used to
present the technical material.
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2.1 System Model
We assume the motion of a space object is given by the differential equation (Cowell’s Formulation)
r¨ =
µ⊕
r3
r + apert(r, r˙, t,ψ), (1)
where r and r˙ are the position and velocity of the space object in 3 dimensions respectively. The
vector apert encapsulates all the perturbing accelerations of the space object other than those
due to the two-body point mass gravitational acceleration. These perturbations could be due to
higher-order gravity terms, atmospheric drag, solar radiations, etc; and ψ ∈ Rd parameterizes these
effects. The perturbation involved in the dynamics of the satellite is essentially parametric [30],
which simplifies the uncertainty propagation algorithm considerably, and particle-based methods
can be used [31].
Sensor observations essentially provide range, azimuth and elevation information and are derived
from signals of electromagnetic radiation. Sensors receive one-way and two-way data via radar or
laser measurements, which have varying degree of accuracy for a particular sensing objective such
as obtaining range, range-rate and angular information for a satellite. Most sensors can provide
observations at far higher frequencies than required. Thus, data density is not an issue. However,
the proximity of data to other information is a more serious concern in satellite tracking. In some
cases, due to mechanical design, geographical, and political constraints, observations are limited to
a small arc of the orbit, which we denote as short-arc observations. If a satellite is observed over
multiple revolutions, it is referred to as long-arc observation. Long-arc observations are preferred
because they provide more accurate determination of the satellite’s orbit. Short-arc observations
on the other hand are important for more accurate near-term satellite motion. Thus the sensor
data is available at multiple-time scales, and a data privacy-utility formulation must account for
this multi-scale nature. For space situational awareness problems, keeping track of a satellite’s
location in its orbit is critical, which relies on the short-arc measurements. Data from these sensors
are only available when the satellites are within sensor range. Thus, predictions must be made
over long intervals between these sensor updates, which is associated with larger error growths.
This impacts the tradeoff between accuracy and privacy. We expect that higher accuracy data
is necessary to resolve errors after long-term uncertainty propagation, and lower accuracy data is
necessary to resolve errors after long-term uncertainty propagation. That is, short-arc observations
can have lower accuracy than long-arc observations, to achieve a given accuracy in the state-
estimate. Consequently, the data privacy-utility policy must also be time varying, accounting for
the variability in the data frequency.
Let x ∈ Rn be the state vector describing the motion of a space object. While there exists many
satellite based coordinates systems to choose from for orbital state-estimation, it is well known that
many of these systems are ill defined for some circular and elliptical orbits [30]. The equinoctial
system eliminates this difficulty and is the best choice to quantify uncertainty in satellite dynamics.
However, the data privacy-utility formulation presented in this paper is agnostic to the choice of
the coordinate system.
Let y ∈ Rny be the measurement variable (measuring range, range-rate and angular information
for a satellite, etc), which is mathematically defined as
y = h(x) + v, (2)
where v represents sensor noise, assumed to be zero-mean Gaussian random process, and x is the
system state vector.
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In this paper, we develop the data privacy-utility algorithm in discrete time, and write (1) and (2)
in discrete time as
xk+1 = f(xk,ψk), (3)
yk = h(xk) + vk, (4)
where f(·, ·) represents the discrete-time dynamics and xk := (x, y, z, x˙, y˙, z˙)
T is the state vector,
and sensor noise vk is assumed to be independent zero-mean Gaussian random variable, i.e. vk ∼
N (0,Rk) and E
[
vkv
T
l
]
= Rkδkl. We further assume that Rk is a diagonal matrix, and define the
inverse of Rk as the precision matrix Sk. Finally, the only uncertainty considered here is the initial
condition uncertainty, which is also assumed to be Gaussian i.e. x0 ∼ N (µ0,Σ0) and independent
of {vk}. Other variables have the same meaning as in (1) and (2).
To account for the multiple-time scales in the data, and exploit the periodic nature of the satellite
motion, we augment the system in (1) and (2) to capture the motion over q time steps. Starting
from time kq, for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · }, we define the augmented discrete-time system dynamics as
Xk+1 = F (Xk,Ψk), Y k =H(Xk) + V k, (5)
where,
Xk := [x
T
kq−q+1, · · · ,x
T
kq]
T ,
Y k := [y
T
kq−q+1, · · · ,y
T
kq]
T ,
Ψk := [ψ
T
kq−q+1, · · · ,ψ
T
kq]
T ,
V k := [v
T
kq−q+1, · · · ,v
T
kq]
T ∼ N (0,Rk),
Rk := diag(Rkq−q+1, · · · ,Rkq),


(6)
denotes stacked variables. Function F k(.) is recursively generated using f(.). The initial condition
X0 is determined by propagating the uncertain initial condition x0 over q time steps. It should
be noted that the augmented model represents a q-step q-shift process, instead of a q-step sliding-
window process. Augmenting the model to q time steps allows Y k to include multi-rate sensor
data y, by defining q to be the lowest common multiple of the various sensing rates, resulting in
a q-periodic system. In this paper, we formulate the privacy-utility policy for the multi-rate data,
using the system in (5).
2.2 Review of Ensemble and Unscented Kalman Filter
In this paper, the data privacy-utility policy is developed in the EnKF and UKF framework, which
is summarized next. The filtering process for the augmented model (5) consists of uncertainty
propagation using the state-dynamics to obtain the prior or model predicted estimate, and using the
data from measurements to obtain the posterior estimate. In EnKF, random samples are generated
directly from the state probability density function (PDF) using standard sampling techniques.
Whereas, UKF uses a deterministic sampling technique known as the unscented transformation
to pick a minimal set of sample points (called sigma points) around the mean. In both these
approaches, the sample points are propagated using the nonlinear dynamics, from which the prior
mean and variance of the states are computed. These are updated using measurements to arrive
at the state estimate with minimum error variance. We briefly present next, the technical details
of both these approaches, which will be necessary for formulating the data-privacy vs data-utility
problem in the EnKF/UKF framework.
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2.2.1 Ensemble Kalman Filter
In this section, we briefly present ensemble Kalman filtering. Let X+k ∈ R
nq×N be the matrix with
N number of posterior samples Xi+k at time k, i.e.
X+k :=
[
X1+k X
2+
k · · · X
N+
k
]
.
The sample mean is then given by,
µ+k := E
[
X+k
]
≈
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xi+k =
1
N
X+k 1N ,
where 1N ∈ R
N is a column vector of N ones.
Defining,
X¯
+
k :=
[
µ+k · · · µ
+
k
]
= µ+k 1
T =
1
N
X+k 1N1
T
N ,
we can compute the variance from the samples Σ+xx,k as,
E
[
(X i+k − µ
+
k )(X
i+
k − µ
+
k )
T
]
≈ X+kAX
+T
k . (7)
where
A :=
[
1
N − 1
(
IN −
1N1
T
N
N
)(
IN −
1N1
T
N
N
)]
The state of each ensemble member at the next time step is determined using the dynamics model:
Xi−k+1 = F (X
i+
k ,Ψ
i
k). (8)
In the EnKF framework, the model predicted ensembles (or prior ensembles) are corrected using
measurements, as proposed by Evensen and Van Leeuwen [27,32]
X i+k+1 =X
i−
k+1 +Σ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +Rk+1
)−1 (
Y k+1 −Hk+1(X
i−
k+1) + ǫ
i
k
)
, (9)
where ǫik is sampled from N (0,Rk). Quantities Σ
−
xy,k+1 and Σ
−
yy,k+1 are computed from the
samples using
Σ−xy,k+1 :=
1
N − 1
(
X−k+1 − X¯
−
k+1
)(
Hk+1(X
−
k+1)−Hk+1(X¯
−
k+1)
)T
, and (10)
Σ−yy,k+1 :=
1
N − 1
(
Hk+1(X
−
k+1)−Hk+1(X¯
−
k+1)
)(
Hk+1(X
−
k+1)−Hk+1(X¯
−
k+1)
)T
. (11)
The variance update equation of the augmented model is given by
Σ+xx,k+1 = Σ
−
xx,k+1 −Σ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +Rk+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1, (12)
where Σ−xx,k+1 = X
−
k+1AX
−T
k+1. Later in the paper, we will be using (12) to determine the optimal
privacy-utility tradeoff.
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2.2.2 Unscented Kalman Filter
The main difference between EnKF and UKF is the generation of the samples and computation
of the first two moments from the samples. The dynamic update step from k → k + 1 starts
with generating deterministic points called σ points. Our dynamic model has no process noise. To
capture the mean µ+k of the state vector X
+
k , where X
+
k ∈ R
nq, as well as the error covariance
Σ+xx,k the sigma points are chosen as
X0+k = µ
+
k ,
Xi+k = µ
+
k +
(√
(nq + ρ)Σ+xx,k
)
i
, i = 1, ..., nq,
Xi+k = µ
+
k −
(√
(nq + ρ)Σ+xx,k
)
i−nq
, i = nq + 1, ..., 2nq,
with associated weights as
ω
(m)
0 = ρ/(nq + ρ),
ω
(c)
0 = ρ/(nq + ρ) + (1− α
2 + β),
ω
(m)
i = 1/{2(nq + ρ)}.
The weight vectors are:
Wm = [ω
(m)
0 ω
(m)
1 ... ω
(m)
2nq+1]
T ,
Wc = [ω
(c)
0 ω
(c)
1 ... ω
(c)
2nq+1]
T ,
where ρ = α2(nq + κ) − nq is the scaling parameter, α is set to 0.001, κ is set to 0, and β is 2 in
this work. The term
(√
(nq + ρ)Σ+xx,k
)
i
represents ith row of the matrix square root.
The propagated state of each ensemble member at time k + 1 is generated exactly as EnKF by
using (8). However for UKF, the corresponding prior mean and variance at time k+1 are given by
µ−k+1 = X
−
k+1W
m, (13)
Σ−xx,k+1 = X
−
k+1BkX
−T
k+1, (14)
where Bk := LL
T , and L := diag(Wc)−Wc1T2nq+1.
We next define the following terms that will be used in the following measurement update phase,
Y−k+1 :=H(X
−
k+1), (15)
Y¯
−
k+1 := Y
−
k+1W
m1T2nq+1, and (16)
X¯
−
k+1 := X
−
k+1W
m1T2nq+1, (17)
where
Y−k+1 :=
[
Y 1−k+1 Y
2−
k+1 · · · Y
(2nq+1)−
k+1
]
, (18)
X−k+1 :=
[
X1−k+1 X
2−
k+1 · · · X
(2nq+1)−
k+1
]
. (19)
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were Y i−k+1 = H(X
i−
k+1) is the i
th measurement sample generated using the measurement model
without the measurement noise.
For the measurement update step, we first calculate Σ−xy,k+1 and Σ
−
yy,k+1 as
Σ−xy,k+1 :=
(
X−k+1 − X¯
−
k+1
)
× diag (Wc)
(
Y−k+1 − Y¯
−
k+1
)T
(20)
Σ−yy,k+1 :=
(
Y−k+1 − Y¯
−
k+1
)
× diag (Wc)
(
Y−k+1 − Y¯
−
k+1
)T
, (21)
and then obtain the updated variance using (12).
Remark 1. Since the variance update equation for EnKF and UKF are identical, this allows us
to formulate a common data privacy-utility policy for both the filtering frameworks. Equation (12)
is fundamental in determining the optimal noise for privacy-utility aware data-sharing.
3 Privacy-Utility Aware Data Sharing in EnKF and UKF
As defined in (12), the accuracy of the state-estimate from EnKF/UKF is quantified by Σ+xx,k+1,
which is defined as
Σ+xx,k+1 = Σ
−
xx,k+1 −Σ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +Rk+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1,
and is the minimum variance for a given Rk+1. Clearly, changing Rk+1 will change Σ
+
xx,k+1. From
an estimation perspective, Rk+1 is given by the sensing hardware, and defines the noise in the
measurements Y k. However, from a data-sharing perspective, we are concerned with the privacy-
utility tradeoff in sharing Y k with end users, which can be influenced by changing Rk+1. For a
state variable, larger error covariance results in increase in privacy and decrease in its utility. On
the other hand, a smaller error covariance, leads to increase in utility and decrease in privacy.
In this paper, we formulate a data privacy-utility trade-off policy in terms of synthetic noise to be
added to Y k to regulate how accurately end users are able to estimate the satellite states in the
EnKF/UKF framework. Consequently, we modify (12), by defining
Rk+1 := R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1 ,
where Rsensork+1 is the known sensor noise variance and quantifies the accuracy of the measured data,
and Rdatak+1 defines the additional synthetic noise to be determined that should be added to the
measured data to achieve a privacy-utility tradeoff. Usually, the sensor noise is assumed to be
uncorrelated, which results in a diagonal Rsensork+1 with positive entries. However, R
data
k+1 can be
assumed to be a general positive semidefinite matrix.
Therefore, Σ+xx,k+1 is now defined as
Σ+xx,k+1 = Σ
−
xx,k+1 −Σ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1. (22)
We generalize the formulation by defining utility in terms of variable Xu := MuX , and privacy
in terms of variable Xp := MpX , where Mu, and M p are known matrices. Partitioning the
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augmented state space into privacy and utility variable is motivated by the work in [33]. The authors
used it to partition the state variable at a particular instant into privacy and utility variables, i.e.
partitioning along the dimension of the variable. In this paper, since we augment the state-vector
to include time-series data, our partitioning matrix Mp and Mu partitions the augmented state-
vector in both space and time. Consequently, we can achieve privacy-utility tradeoffs in space and
time, and are highlighted in the examples.
The error variance in the estimates for Xu and Xp are given by
Σ+xuxu,k+1 :=MuΣ
+
xx,k+1M
T
u ,
=MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u −MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u , and
(23)
Σ+xpxp,k+1 :=MpΣ
+
xx,k+1M
T
p ,
=MpΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
p −MpΣ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
p . (24)
Thus, the objective here is to determine Rdatak+1 that allows end users to estimate states Xu accu-
rately enough, but not estimate states Xp too accurately, i.e. given Σp and Σu, we would like
to determine Rdatak+1 that satisfies Σp ≤ Σ
+
xpxp,k+1
and Σ+xuxu,k+1 ≤ Σu simultaneously, where Σp
defines the accuracy limit from a privacy perspective and Σu defines the accuracy limit from a
utility perspective.
Since Σ+xpxp,k+1 and Σ
+
xuxu,k+1
depend on Rdatak+1 , they are upper and lower bounded by values
obtained for Rdatak+1 = ∞ and R
data
k+1 = 0 respectively, i.e.
Σ+xpxp,k+1(0) ≤ Σ
+
xpxp,k+1
(Rdatak+1 ) ≤ Σ
+
xpxp,k+1
(∞) = Σ−xpxp,k+1, (25)
Σ+xuxu,k+1(0) ≤ Σ
+
xuxu,k+1
(Rdatak+1 ) ≤ Σ
+
xpxu,k+1
(∞) = Σ−xuxu,k+1, (26)
where Σ+xpxp,k+1(·) and Σ
+
xuxu,k+1
(·) denote the functional dependence of the variances on Rdatak+1 .
Consequently, these inequalities define the limits on the achievable privacy and utility.
We next present the main results of this paper, which are convex optimization formulations for
achieving optimal privacy-utility tradeoff in the general EnKF/UKF framework. We use a relaxed
definition for privacy and utility, by defining them in terms of trace of the variance matrices, i.e.
Privacy: tr
(
Σ+xpxp,k+1
)
≥ γp, (27a)
Utility: tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, (27b)
where γp and γu are user defined.
3.1 Maximum Noise Satisfying Utility Constraints
Here we present a convex optimization problem, which determines the maximum synthetic noise
that can be added and still satisfy the upper bound on tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
and is given by the following
theorem.
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Theorem 1. The maximum noise that satisfies tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, is given by the solution of
the following optimization problem
min
Sdata
k+1
≥0,Qu≥0
tr
(
Sdatak+1
)
, (28a)
subject to[
Qu −MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u +MuΣ
−
xy,k+1Z
−1Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u Z +ZS
data
k+1Z
]
≥ 0, (28b)
tr (Qu) ≤ γu, (28c)
where Z := Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 . The maximum noise in the data for which the utility constraint is
satisfied is then given by Rdatak+1 :=
(
Sdatak+1
)−1
.
Proof. Using (23), tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, is equivalent to
Qu −MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u +MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u ≥ 0,
and tr (Qu) ≤ γu. Using matrix inversion lemma (Hua’s identity), we get
Σ−yy,k+1 +Rsensork+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Z
+Rdatak+1


−1
= Z−1 −
{
Z +Z
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
Z
}−1
.
Therefore, the inequality becomes
Qu −MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u +MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
[
Z−1 −
{
Z +Z
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
Z
}−1]
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u ≥ 0,
or
Qu −MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u +MuΣ
−
xy,k+1Z
−1Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u−
MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
{
Z +Z
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
Z
}−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u ≥ 0,
or using Schur complement we get[
Qu −MuΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
u +MuΣ
−
xy,k+1Z
−1Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u MuΣ
−
xy,k+1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
u Z +Z
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
Z
]
≥ 0.
Introducing a new variable Sdatak+1 :=
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
, which is the precision of the data, we get the LMI
in (28b). Therefore, maximization of tr
(
Rdatak+1
)
becomes minimization of tr
(
Sdatak+1
)
.
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The above optimization is performed every time a new batch of Y k+1 is shared, which is corrupted
using Rdatak+1 .
For a special case of linear sensor model, i.e. H(Xk) := CXk, we can substitute Σ
−
xy := Σ
−
xxC
T
and Σ−yy := CΣ
−
xxC
T , in the above optimization problem.
Remark 2. In the above theorem, we need to compute the inverse of Z := (Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 ),
which may be ill-conditioned, particularly when Σ−yy,k+1 is rank deficient and R
sensor
k+1 is small
(corresponding to very precise sensor measurements, for example from laser ranging). This problem
occurs in satellite tracking problems. We next present an alternate formulation, which does not
require the matrix inverse, but the matrix square root, at the expense of increasing the problem
size. This is given by the following result, assuming linear measurement model.
Theorem 2. The maximum noise that satisfies tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, is given by the solution of
the following optimization problem
min
Sdata
k+1
≥0,Qu≥0,K
tr
(
Sdatak+1
)
, (29a)
subject to

Qu Mu(I −KC)
√
Σ−xx,k+1 MuK MuK√
Σ−xx,k+1(I −KC)
TMTu I 0 0
KTMTu 0
(
Rsensork+1
)−1
0
KTMTu 0 0 S
data
k+1

 ≥ 0, (29b)
tr (Qu) ≤ γu. (29c)
Proof. Recalling that the posterior variance in Kalman filtering is also given by Σ+xx = (I −
KC)Σ−xx(I −KC)
T +KRKT , tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, is equivalent to
Qu −Mu(I −KC)Σ
−
xx,k+1(I −KC)
TMTu +MuK
(
Rsensork+1 +R
data
k+1
)
KTMTu ≥ 0, (30)
along with tr (Qu) ≤ γu.
Using Schur complement we can write (30) as,

Qu Mu(I −KC)
√
Σ−xx,k+1 MuK MuK√
Σ−xx,k+1(I −KC)
TMTu I 0 0
KTMTu 0
(
Rsensork+1
)−1
0
KTMTu 0 0
(
Rdatak+1
)−1

 ≥ 0.
Introducing a new variable Sdatak+1 :=
(
Rdatak+1
)−1
, we get the LMI in (29b), in terms of Sdatak+1 .
Maximization of tr
(
Rdatak+1
)
becomes minimization of tr
(
Sdatak+1
)
.
The above result simultaneously determines the Kalman gain K and the optimal noise in the data,
for which upper bound on posterior variance is achieved.
Remark 3. The discussion so far has been on adding maximum synthetic noise to existing data,
for which utility is achieved. This is relevant in situations where the collected data has multiple use
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with different accuracy needs. Thus, it is meaningful to sense at the highest accuracy and then add
synthetic noise depending on accuracy needs. However, in some applications, it may be economical
to determine the sensing accuracy directly, since higher accuracy is associated with higher cost.
Theorem 2 can be modified to determine the optimal sensing precision for which the prescribed
accuracy in the state estimate is achieved. It is given by the following result.
Corollary 1. The minimum sensing precision that satisfies tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, is given by the
solution of the following optimization problem
min
λ≥0,Qu≥0,K
‖λ‖1, (31a)
subject to 

Qu Mu(I −KC)
√
Σ−xx,k+1 MuK√
Σ−xx,k+1(I −KC)
TMTu I 0
KTMTu 0 S
sensor

 ≥ 0, (31b)
tr (Qu) ≤ γu. (31c)
where
Ssensor := diag(λ),
and λ is the sensor precision which is the reciprocal of the sensor noise.
Proof. The proof is similar to theorem 2, with the sensor precision as a variable with a diagonal
structure.
Remark 4. Sparse Sensing: The l1 cost in (31a) induces sparseness in the solution, i.e. many
entries of the optimal λ are expected to be zero. These correspond to zero precision, implying that
the corresponding sensor is not required to achieve the required accuracy in the state estimate, and
can be eliminated from further consideration. From a system design perspective, this is quite useful.
We can formulate the optimization problem with a dictionary of sensors, admitting redundancy in
the sensing. The l1 optimization will result in the optimal (possibly sparse) sensing precisions that
will achieve the required accuracy in the state estimate.
Remark 5. It is possible that the user specifies multiple partitions of the augmented state X for
utility, i.e. Xu1 :=Mu1X, . . . ,Xur :=MurX , with accuracy bounds
tr
(
Mu1Σ
+MTu1
)
≤ γu1 , · · · , tr
(
MurΣ
+MTur
)
≤ γur .
In such a case, each upper-bound constraint will add a pair of inequalities to the optimization
problem, similar to (31b) and (31c), but in terms of variable Qui .
3.2 Minimum Noise Satisfying Privacy Constraints
We next present a convex optimization problem, which determines the minimum synthetic noise
needed to satisfy the lower bound on Σ+xpxp,k+1. It is given by the following theorem.
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Theorem 3. The minimum noise that satisfies tr
(
Σ+xpxp,k+1
)
≥ γp, is given by the solution of
the following optimization problem
min
Rdata
k+1
≥0,Qp≥0
tr
(
Rdatak+1
)
, (32a)
such that, [
MpΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
p −Qp MpΣ
−
xy,k+1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
p
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)] ≥ 0, (32b)
tr (Qp) ≥ γp. (32c)
Proof. From (24), and tr
(
Σ+xpxp,k+1
)
≥ γp we get the following equivalent conditions
MpΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
p −Qp −M pΣ
−
xy,k+1
(
Σ−yy,k+1 +R
sensor
k+1 +R
data
k+1
)−1
Σ−
T
xy,k+1M
T
p ≥ 0, (33)
tr (Qp) ≥ γp. (34)
Using Schur complement, we can write inequality in (33) as the LMI in (32b) with respect to
Rdatak+1 .
Remark 6. Like in the utility case, it is possible that the user specifies multiple partitions of the
augmented state X for privacy, i.e. Xp1 :=Mp1X, . . . ,Xpq :=M pqX, with privacy bounds
tr
(
Mp1Σ
+MTp1
)
≥ γp1 , . . . , tr
(
M pqΣ
+MTpq
)
≥ γpq .
In such a case, each lower-bound constraint will add a pair of inequalities to the optimization
problem, similar to (32b) and (32c), but in terms of variable Qpi .
3.3 Optimal Privacy-Utility Tradeoff
The optimization problems in the previous two sections have addresses utility and privacy sepa-
rately. In this section, we present a joint formulation for determining the optimal privacy-utility
trade-off. We formulate the optimization problems around two notions of the trade-off.
3.3.1 Utility-aware privacy
The first notion is utility-aware privacy, where the utility is specified via hard constraint γu and
the privacy is maximized. This results in the following optimization formulation: This results in
the following formulation:
max γp, subject to tr
(
Σ+xpxp,k+1
)
≥ γp, and tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, (35)
for a given γu. This can be generalized to multiple partitions of X for privacy and utility.
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3.3.2 Privacy-aware utility
The second notion is privacy-aware utility, where the privacy is specified via hard constraint γp and
the utility is maximized. This results in the following formulation:
min γu, subject to tr
(
Σ+xpxp,k+1
)
≥ γp, and tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu, (36)
for a given γp. This can also be generalized to multiple partitions of X for both privacy and utility.
The idea is to combine the optimization formulations from theorem 1 (or 2) and theorem 3 into a
single formulation. However, theorems 1 (or 2) and 3 involve variables Sdatak+1 and R
data
k+1 that are
constrained by Sdatak+1R
data
k+1 = Iny . which is nonconvex. In this paper, we linearize this constraint
about a known value of Sdatak+1 andR
data
k+1 , and iteratively update it to arrive at a suboptimal solution.
That is, initially we assume S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1 are given and we write,
Sdatak+1 := S¯
data
k+1 + S˜
data
k+1 ≥ 0, and (37)
Rdatak+1 := R¯
data
k+1 + R˜
data
k+1 ≥ 0, (38)
and linearize Sdatak+1R
data
k+1 = Iny about S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1 , to get
S˜
data
k+1R¯
data
k+1 + S¯
data
k+1R˜
data
k+1 = 0, (39)
and solve for S˜
data
k+1 and R˜
data
k+1 .
We next present the complete optimization formulation for utility-aware privacy, formulated as-
suming linear sensing model. It can be generalized to nonlinear sensing model by formulating it
around theorems 1 and 3.
Theorem 4. The data noise that satisfies the utility-constraint tr
(
Σ+xuxu,k+1
)
≤ γu for a given
γu, and maximizes privacy, is given by the solution of the following optimization problem:
max
Qp,Qu, S˜
data
k+1, R˜
data
k+1,K, γp
γp (40a)
subject to

Qu Mu(I −KC)
√
Σ−xx,k+1 MuK MuK√
Σ−xx,k+1(I −KC)
TMTu I 0 0
KTMTu 0
(
Rsensork+1
)−1
0
KTMTu 0 0 S
data
k+1

 ≥ 0, (40b)
[
MpΣ
−
xx,k+1M
T
p −Qp MpΣ
−
xx,k+1C
T
CΣ−xx,k+1M
T
p
(
CΣ−xx,k+1C
T +Rsensork+1 +R
data
k+1
)] ≥ 0, (40c)
tr (Qu) ≤ γu, (40d)
tr (Qp) ≥ γp, (40e)
Sdatak+1 := S¯
data
k+1 + S˜
data
k+1 ≥ 0, (40f)
Rdatak+1 := R¯
data
k+1 + R˜
data
k+1 ≥ 0, (40g)
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S˜
data
k+1R¯
data
k+1 + S¯
data
k+1R˜
data
k+1 = 0. (40h)
Proof. Builds on the proof for theorems 2 and 3, along with linearization of the nonconvex constraint
Sdatak+1R
data
k+1 = Iny .
Remark 7. The optimization for privacy-aware utility can be formulated by replacing (40a) with
min
Qp,Qu, S˜
data
k+1 , R˜
data
k+1 ,K, γu
γu (41)
where γp is user specified.
Remark 8. Optimization problem (40) can also be generalized to multiple partitions of X for
both privacy and utility, by introducing new variables {Qpi}, {Quj}, and {γpi} or {γuj}.
Optimization in (40), is solved repeatedly with updated values of S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1 , until there is no
significant change in the cost function. For the next iteration, S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1 are updated with
the optimal S˜
data
k+1 and R˜
data
k+1 . The update however, is slightly different for utility-aware privacy
and privacy-aware utility. For utility-aware privacy, we must ensure utility constraints are satisfied.
Since the optimization in (40) satisfies this constraint with Sdatak+1 := S¯
data
k+1 + S˜
data
k+1 , we update S¯
data
k+1
and R¯
data
k+1 as
S¯
data
k+1 := S¯
data
k+1 + S˜
data
k+1 , and (42a)
R¯
data
k+1 :=
(
S¯
data
k+1
)−1
. (42b)
For privacy-aware utility, we must ensure privacy constraints are satisfied. Since the optimization
(see remark 7) satisfies this constraint with Rdatak+1 := R¯
data
k+1 + R˜
data
k+1 , we update S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1
for this case, as
R¯
data
k+1 := R¯
data
k+1 + R˜
data
k+1 , and (43a)
S¯
data
k+1 :=
(
R¯
data
k+1
)−1
. (43b)
Pseudocode for implementing the above iterative algorithm for utility-aware privacy is presented in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm for privacy-aware utility can be similarly developed by incorporating
the changes from remark 7 and (43), in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for utility-aware privacy
Initialize: S¯
data
k+1 := Iny , R¯
data
k+1 := Iny # Any other initialization may work
Initialize: γpold := 1e
10 # Something large
Initialize: ǫ := 10−3 # Tolerance
Initialize: done := false
while done == false
Solve optimization problem in (40) to get γp, S˜
data
k+1 and R˜
data
k+1
if |γp − γpold | ≤ ǫ
done := true
else
γpold := γp
Update S¯
data
k+1 and R¯
data
k+1 using (42)
end
end
4 Numerical Simulation
In this section, we apply the proposed algorithms for tracking the International Space Station (ISS),
with its orbit defined by the following TLE set:
ISS (ZARYA)
1 25544U 98067A 19248.67387091 0.00001921 00000-0 41082-4 0 9997
2 25544 51.6464 322.0340 0007976 9.5374 121.4565 15.50435809187740
The orbit is propagated in Keplerian coordinates (a, e, i,Ω, ω, f), with uncertain initial conditions
and J4 perturbation. Initial condition uncertainty is assumed to be only in the semi-major axis
(a). It is modeled as a Gaussian random variable with mean defined by the TLE set and standard-
deviation equal to 1% of the mean. This uncertainty is represented with 100 samples.
Since the algorithms proposed here assume Gaussian uncertainty (EnKF and UKF), we transform
the 6 dimensional orbit data from Keplerian coordinates (a, e, i,Ω, ω, f) to Cartesian coordinates
(x, y, z, u, v, w), and investigate the privacy-utility tradeoff in this representation. From fig.(1), we
see that 1% uncertainty in a causes significant increase in the state uncertainty after only one orbit,
and therefore it provides a rich enough data set for investigating privacy-utility tradeoff.
We also assume that we can sense (x, y, z), which gives us a linear measurement model. Conse-
quently, we apply the corresponding algorithms to demonstrate the privacy-utility tradeoff. The
orbit data is generated for 6000 seconds, at 1 second intervals. This captures one orbit of the ISS.
We extract (x, y, z) at arbitrarily chosen times 0, 1600, 1900, 3400, 5100 seconds, and treat them as
measurements. These times are also expressed as 0, 0.27Torb, 0.32Torb, 0.57Torb, 0.85Torb, where
Torb := 6000 seconds is the time for one orbit. The locations of these measurements, or the sens-
ing sites, are shown in fig.(2a). Using these five sensing sites, the objective of this example is to
demonstrate:
1. the optimal sensor precisions that achieve the given utility in the state estimate,
2. minimum synthetic noise in the sensed data that achieves the prescribed privacy,
3. the optimal sensor precisions that achieve utility-aware privacy, i.e. maximize privacy with
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Figure 1: Growth in positional uncertainty due to 1% uncertainty in the initial semi-major axis.
given utility constraints.
These studies are performed with respect to the position of the ISS, and are presented next.
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Figure 2: Optimal sensing precision satisfying utility constraints only.
4.1 Minimum Precision Guaranteeing Required Utility
Here we determine the precisions of sensors for which the utility constraints are satisfied. This
is achieved by applying the optimization problem formulation from corollary 1. Fig.(2a) shows
the location of the sensing sites, along with the locations where the utility constraints are to be
satisfied. These are imposed at times 0.15Torb, and 0.4Torb. Recall that utility constraints are
defined by (27), and for this example we choose γui := 1 km, i.e. the utility constraints are
tr
(
MuiΣ
+MTui
)
≤ 1. Matrices Mui are mask matrices, which extract the variance of the error
in (x, y, z) estimates, at times 0.15Torb and 0.4Torb respectively. Fig.(2b) shows the summation of
the (x, y, z) sensor precisions, at each of the five sensing sites, for which the utility constraints are
satisfied. This is confirmed by fig.(2c).
From fig.(2b), we see that minimization of the l1 norm in (31) results in a sparse sensing architecture,
i.e. many of the sensor precisions are zero. Therefore, only data from the sensing site #5, with
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the indicated precision, is required to satisfy the utility constraint. There are three implications of
this result. Firstly, from a sensing perspective, only sensors at site #5 are sufficient to track the
object at the specified locations with the required accuracy. This helps in sensor allocations for
space object tracking. Secondly, the optimal sensing precision can be used to optimize the energy
used in the radar/laser based sensing. Finally, from a data sharing perspective, if data is available
from all the sensing sites – only data from location #5 needs to be shared. If the accuracy of the
sensed data is more than required, it can be corrupted by noise defined by the reciprocal of the
precision value. This will protect the economic value of the data [34].
We also observe that data from the future is used to satisfy the utility constraints in the past,
resulting in optimal smoothing. Since the optimization is formulated as a batch estimation, this is
possible. The results are consistent with the fact that optimal smoothers generally achieve lower
mean-square error than optimal filters [35]. This allows utility constraints in the past to be satisfied
with least sensor precisions.
4.2 Minimum Noise Guaranteeing Required Privacy
In this section, we apply the optimization problem from theorem 3 to determine the minimal noise
in the sensor data for which the errors in the state estimates are above a prescribed value, at the
specified location in the orbit. The location where privacy is required is shown in fig.(3a), which
corresponds to time 0.82Torb. The privacy constraint is defined by (27) with γp := 5.17
2. This is
determined by requiring tr
(
MpΣ
+MTp
)
≥ 10−4tr
(
MpΣ
−MTp
)
, whereMp extracts the variance
of the error in (x, y, z) estimates at time 0.82Torb. The sensing sites are the same as the above
problem.
Fig.(3b) shows the summation of the (x, y, z) sensor noise variances, at each of the five sensing sites,
for which the privacy constraints are satisfied. We see that the minimum noise, for which privacy is
guaranteed, has an increasing trend, with higher noise in the vicinity of the location where privacy
is required. Fig.(3c) shows
√
tr (Σ+), which satisfies the privacy constraints at t = 0.82Torb, i.e.√
tr
(
M pΣ+MTp
)
≥ 5.17. Therefore, from a data-sharing perspective, sensor data from the 5 sites
should be corrupted with synthetic noise – defined by the optimal noise variances in fig.(3b), to
ensure the required privacy.
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Figure 3: Optimal sensor noise for only privacy.
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4.3 Utility-Aware Maximum Privacy
We next present results obtained by applying Algorithm 1 to the ISS data set, where privacy is
maximized with utility constraints. The locations of sensors, the utility constraints, and the location
where privacy is required, are the same as in the above studies. Fig.(4b) shows the sensor precisions
for which the utility constraints (same as those in §4.1) are satisfied and privacy is maximized. The
resulting posterior is shown in fig.(4c). We observe that utility constraints are satisfied at times
0.15Torb, and 0.4Torb, while privacy is maximized at time 0.82Torb . Fig.(4c) also shows the case
when privacy is not maximized, but only utility is satisfied with minimum precision, i.e. the case
discussed in §4.1. We see that utility-aware maximum privacy is able to achieve about 1.63 times
more privacy. The value of
√
tr
(
MpΣ+MTp
)
in §4.1 is 2.26, whereas
√
tr
(
MpΣ+MTp
)
in this
case is 4.35. Thus, we can see the benefit Algorithm 1.
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Figure 4: Optimal sensor precision for utility-aware privacy over one orbit of the ISS.
Fig.(4b) shows that the utility constraints are satisfied using most precise data from the future (i.e.
site #4) , which implies that the optimization primarily applies smoothing to satisfy the utility
constraints. This is similar to the results from fig.(2b), where smoothing was used to satisfy the
utility constraints.
We also see that privacy is maximized by reducing the precision at site #5. Data from site #5
is from the future, and incorporating this data would reduce uncertainty at all past locations due
to smoothing. This would not maximize privacy. Low precision data from site #5 essentially
means that no update is made to the prior beyond the data from the sensing site #4, and this
maximizes the privacy. Consequently, data from site #4 plays an important role. It is used to
satisfy the uncertainty constraints at the utility sites using smoothing, and maximize uncertainty
at the privacy site using prediction.
Remark 9. The examples above, are shown with data from one orbit, where privacy is maximized
after the utility. This is a simpler scenario, because state uncertainty grows without update and
hence it is easier to achieve higher uncertainty, and hence privacy, at later times.
In the next example, we consider an interesting scenario where privacy is maximized in between
two locations where utility is constrained. For this scenario, we consider data from five orbits of
the ISS, with data saved every 100 seconds and measurements available at arbitrarily chosen times
0, 0.15Torb, 0.82Torb, 1.65Torb, 3.32Torb, 4.15Torb, and 4.98Torb. Therefore, there are 7 sensing
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sites, measuring (x, y, z). The utility constraints are imposed at times 0.48Torb and 4.82Torb, with
tr
(
MuiΣ
+MTui
)
≤ 1. Privacy is maximized at the time 2.48Torb. Therefore, privacy is maximized
in between the two times where utility is constrained. The privacy and utility time points are chosen
arbitrarily.
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Figure 5: Optimal sensor precision for utility-aware privacy over five orbits of the ISS.
Fig.(5) shows the results from the utility-aware privacy optimization for this case. In fig.(5a), the
optimal sensor precisions that satisfy the utility constraints are shown. We observe that data from
sites #1 to #5 are not required to satisfy the utility constraints. Only data from sites #6 and #7
are required, with the given precisions. The corresponding
√
tr (Σ+) is shown in fig.(5c) in blue,
and we can see that the utility constraints are satisfied at times 0.48Torb and 4.82Torb. Achieving
the utility with minimum precision implicitly achieves a certain level of privacy at time 2.48T , as we
can see
√
tr (Σ+) increases between times 0.48T and 4.82T . Fig.(5c) also shows in red,
√
tr (Σ+)
from utility-aware privacy maximization. We can see that it achieves significantly higher privacy at
time 2.48T . The value of
√
tr
(
MpΣ+MTp
)
from utility-only optimization is 2.67, and the value
of
√
tr
(
M pΣ+MTp
)
from utility-aware privacy maximization is 4.45, resulting in an improvement
by a factor of 1.67. The corresponding sensor precisions are shown in fig.(5b). Therefore, for this
example too, we see that Algorithm 1 is able to achieve higher privacy, while satisfying the utility
constraints.
We next discuss the convergence property of Algorithm 1. For the results shown in fig.(4) and
fig.(5), the respective convergences are shown in fig.(6), where ∆J := |γp − γpold |.
Empirically, we observe that in both the cases the algorithm convergences to the optimal solution
within 18 iterations, for ǫ := 10−3. The associated computational times are summarized in table
1. For every iteration, the optimization problem for the 1-orbit problem takes an average of 3.5
seconds. Whereas, for the 5-orbit problem, optimizations take an average of 235.93 seconds, which
is higher due to larger problem size. The computational times for the utility-only optimization are
also shown in the table. We observe that for 1 and 5 orbit problems, the computational times are
0.5 and 28.26 seconds respectively. These times are obtained in MATLAB, with YALMIP [36] as
the parser and MOSEK [37] as the solver, executing in a Mac Book Pro with 2.3 GHz Quad-Core
Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB (1600 MHz DDR3) memory.
Therefore, the utility-only optimization results in significantly faster solution, but the privacy is not
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(a) Convergence of Algorithm 1 for the 1-Orbit
problem shown in fig.(4).
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(b) Convergence of Algorithm 1 for the 5-Orbit
problem shown in fig.(5).
Figure 6: Convergence of Algorithm 1.
1-Orbit Problem 5-Orbit Problem
Utility-aware Privacy 3.5 235.93
Utility-Only 0.5 28.26
Table 1: Average computational times (sec) for 1 and 5 orbit problems. These times are obtained
in MATLAB, with YALMIP [36] as the parser and MOSEK [37] as the solver.
maximized. Whereas, with the utility-aware privacy maximization, we are able to achieve higher
privacy but with significantly higher computational time. Since both the formulations solve a semi-
definite program, the computational times are expected to grow polynomially using interior-point
method. Therefore, for large-scale problems, specialized methods (such as first order methods) can
be applied to solve the optimization problem.
5 Conclusion & Summary
In this paper we presented a new formulation that addresses optimal privacy vs utility tradeoff in
the Ensemble/Unscented Kalman filtering framework. Privacy and utility are defined in terms of
the estimation error variances. The formulation achieves this tradeoff by injecting synthetic noise
to the sensor data, which is used to regulate the posterior error covariance.
We demonstrated how this formulation can be applied to achieve the tradeoff in the context of
space-object tracking problem. We were able to show that it is possible to satisfy utility (defined
by upper bounding the estimation error), while achieving a certain level of privacy (defined by
lower-bounding the estimation error).
In particular, the presented results demonstrated that:
1. Utility upper-bounds can be satisfied with sparse sensing, which also indirectly helps in sensor
scheduling. This is achieved by satisfying the utility constraints with maximum sensor noise or
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minimum sensor precision, where the precision is defined to be the inverse of noise. Sparseness
in sensing is achieved by l1 minimization.
2. Privacy lower-bounds can be satisfied by maximizing the noise in the sensor.
3. A joint optimization problem for utility-aware privacy is able to maximize privacy (i.e. max-
imize the lower bound), while satisfying utility upper bound. Similarly, a joint-optimization
can maximize utility (i.e. minimize the upper bound), while satisfying the privacy lower
bound.
These results have significant implications from a data sharing perspective. The above optimization
problems determine the level of synthetic noise that should be added to the raw sensed data, such
that the desired privacy-utility tradeoff is achieved. This is important, because privacy concerns
can result in conservative data obfuscation and severely impede utility. On the other hand, utility
concerns can result in excessive sensing accuracy, which can violate privacy concerns and perhaps be
uneconomical from a system design and operations perspective. Therefore, we expect our framework
to enable better data collection and sharing policy, particularly for the SSA community. In addition,
since SSA data is being commoditized, the proposed algorithms will enable data-products with
different levels of accuracy, corresponding to various stratified pricing models for future value-added
services in space-data analytics.
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